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11 Introduction
In many countries ﬁscal decentralization characterizes the relationship among
diﬀerent levels of government. In those countries, local authorities have the
prerogative to tax the population within their jurisdiction. However, ﬁscal
decentralization is seldom balanced in terms of tax and expenditure assign-
ments. In order to equalize tax capacities, to internalize spillovers or to
achieve national policy objectives, central governments often provide trans-
fers to lower levels of government.
These transfers may aﬀect the incentives of lower levels of government
to manage or to improve their ﬁscal performance. Speciﬁcally, according to
Litvack, Ahmad and Bird (1998), such transfers may induce low ‘tax eﬀort’
in the regions. The purpose of this paper is to investigate theoretically this
relationship between intergovernmental transfers and local tax eﬀort.
An initial problem to deal with is the deﬁnition of ‘tax eﬀort’ in itself.
First, one can associate tax eﬀort to high tax rates. Smart (1998) asserted
that such association is inadequate. Basing his analysis in the Canadian
Equalization System, he showed that high tax rates may indeed mean low
tax eﬀort. Second, one can measure tax eﬀort using actual tax revenues or
the diﬀerence between tax revenues and the predicted value coming from a
regression explaining tax capacity. This approach has been mainly adopted
by the empirical literature on tax eﬀort [e.g. Bahl (1971), Chelliah, Baas
and Kelly (1975), Bird and Wallich (1992)] and on the relationship between
intergovernmental transfers and local tax eﬀort [Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau
(2000), Von Hagen and Hepp (2000), Jha, Mohanty, Chattergee and Chitkara
(1999), Sagbas (2001)]. Although tax revenue is an accurate and observable
variable, still one can hardly say that it is a good estimate of tax eﬀort. The
reason is for a given region in a given time period tax revenue is aﬀected
by a myriad of potential variables outside the control of local governments
(like idiosyncratic shocks to some speciﬁc tax bases) which are seldom well
controlled for in estimates of tax capacity.
In practice tax eﬀort made by local governments encompasses a broad set
of actions. One of them is clearly the battle against tax evasion. In spite
of the importance of the enforcement of the local tax laws, this problem has
been only recently addressed by the local public ﬁnance literature. In their
working paper, Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (1996), presented a model
where a local government exerts costless eﬀort to catch tax evader work-
ers and they showed how intergovernmental transfers aﬀect tax enforcement.
The drawback of this model is that, in reality, tax enforcement is not cost-
less and the cost depends upon other variables chosen by local authorities,
like the eﬃciency of the local tax administration. Although Prud’homme
2(1995) and Tanzi (1996) have informally warned against the fact that local
tax administrations may be less eﬃcient than central ones, there has been
little mention in the theoretical or in the empirical literature on this issue.
The purpose of this paper is precisely to incorporate such dimension in the
assessment of the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and local
tax eﬀort.
We develop a theoretical model where these other dimensions of the tax
policy are endogenously determined. In each region there is one represen-
tative habitant and a local government. The habitant posses a low or a
high-valued property. The local government maximizes tax revenues. In a
ﬁrst stage, the local government invests resources to improve the eﬃciency
of the tax administration or to lobby the central government in order to ob-
tain discretionary transfers. This decision is aﬀected by the political cost of
reforming the tax administration (which is higher in case of divided govern-
ment) and on the ability of the local government to negotiate with the central
government (which depends on the political representation of the region in
the Congress). Thus, in our model, intergovernmental transfers are endoge-
nous and simultaneously determined with the reform of the local tax system.
In a second stage, the local government sets the property tax schedule. But,
as the local government is unable to observe the value of the property, it has
to rely on the habitant announcing this value. Finally, in the third stage, the
local government decides to enforce the tax law by randomly auditing such
announcement. If the habitant is discovered having misreported, the local
government sets the corresponding property tax and imposes a penalty. We
assume that audit is perfect but costly; the cost depending on the eﬃciency
of the local tax administration.
We solve the model backwards. As the local government cannot commit
to the auditing probability when it designs its tax policy, the equilibrium of
the audit-report game is in mixed strategies, with auditing and tax evasion.
Then we ﬁnd the optimal tax schedule. In order to reduce the stake for tax
evasion, the local government distorts downwardly the high-valued property
tax. Finally, we solve for the decision of the local government regarding
how much resources to invest for improving the level of eﬃciency of the
tax administration. We ﬁnd that this decision is negatively associated with
the domestic political and positively with the political representation in the
Congress.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the
model. In Section 3, we solve the model backwardly. Then we conclude.
32T h e m o d e l
The nation The country is composed by two regions r = j,k,e a c hr u l e db y
a local authority. Until Section6, we concentrate our attention in one region.
So we eliminate the subscripts r from the variables.
Habitant There is one representative habitant in the region. He might be
of two diﬀerent types i =  ,h, with respective probability µ and 1 − µ.T h e
habitant’s type concerns its property. We assume that, in a (not modeled)
previous stage, the habitant i inherited a house of value vi. These values
verify v  <v h : t h eh o u s ec a nb el o w - v a l u e d( v )o rh i g h - v a l u e d( vh). The
utility of a habitant i is thus
Ui = vi − ti
where ti is a property tax.
The local authority Before the ﬁrst stage of the model, the local authority
is endowed with a budget B. With this budget, her goal is to maximize the
expected net revenue
ENR= T + ELTC
where T is a transfer from the federal government and ELTC, the expected
tax collection.
In the ﬁrst stage, the local authority chooses the amount of resources θ
devoted to improve her tax administration. From now on, we will consider
that the amount θ c a nb ea s s i m i l a t e dt oa ne ﬃciency parameter of the local
tax administration. The rest of the budget B − θ c a nb eu s e dt ol o b b yt h e
federal government to obtain an increase in the transfer T.
In the second stage, the local authority chooses a property tax with the
goal to maximize the (expected) local tax collection. But, as the local au-
thority is unable to observe vi, she has to rely on the habitant announcing
e vi.
In order to enforce the tax law, in a third stage, the local authority audits
the announcement e vi with probability π(e vi). Auditing is costly: when the
local authority audits, she bears the cost c(θ,z), where z represent regional











Therefore, z is related to the degree of diﬃculty to audit. For example, z
represents a more dispersed population or more geographical accidents, both
characteristics that increase the cost of audit.
4We assume that audit is perfect: after an audit, the true level of vi
is discovered. If the habitant is discovered having misreported, the local
government sets the property tax that corresponds to his true value vi and
a ﬁne F (that we deﬁne later). We denote the property tax schedule by
ti = t(e vi) and the probabilities of auditing by πi = π(e vi).
There are institutional constraints that prevent the local authority from
exploiting the habitant, so Ui ≥ 0.
Timing of the model we gather the previous comments in the timing of
the model
1. The local authority chooses the local tax administration’s eﬃciency θ
2. The local authority designs the property tax schedule {t ,t h}
3. The habitant reports his type and the local authority audits this an-
nouncement
We solve the model backwards. First we completely characterize the so-
lution of the report-audit game. Then we ﬁnd the optimal property tax
schedule. Finally, we characterize the optimal choice of the local tax admin-
istration’s eﬃciency θ.
3 The report-audit game
Due to institutional failures, the local government cannot commit to its audit-
ing policy. Moreover, we assume that the report-audit game is simultaneous.
Let’s consider that the local authority has designed a tax schedule verify-
ing t  <t h.1 Therefore, a  -habitant will never misreport. But this is not the
case for a h-habitant, which may be tempted to understate his true value vh.
In this last case, if he is caught after an audit, the local authority imposes
him to pay his due tax (th) and a ﬁne F = λ|th − t |, which is proportional
to the evaded tax. The following proposition characterizes the equilibria of
this game.
Proposition 1 If (1 − µ)(1 + λ)(th − t ) ≤ c(θ,z),t h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u mi s
in pure strategies: the local authority never audits and the h-habitant always
misreports. If (1 − µ)(1 + λ)(th − t ) >c (θ,z), the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies. The local authority audits with probability b π = 1
1+λ and the h-
habitant misreports with probability b p =
c(θ,z)
(1−µ)(1+λ)(th−t ).
1We will show later that this asumption is without loss of generality.
5W h e nt h ec o s to fa u d i ti sa b o v et h eb e n e ﬁt of auditing, the local authority
never audits and there is always tax evasion. But when the cost of audit
is low, the local authority starts auditing and the h-habitant misreports.
Therefore, in this model, there is fraud cum auditing in equilibrium, provided
the cost of audit is low.
With these results, we can compute the expected local tax collection
ELTC (net of the cost of audit) when the local authority designs the property
tax schedule. When (1 + λ)(th − t ) ≤ c(θ,z),
ELTC
P = t 
where the superscript P denotes that the equilibrium is in pure strategies.
When (1 + λ)(th − t ) >c (θ,z)
ETCM =( 1 − b p)b π[µt  +( 1− µ)th − c(θ,z)]
+(1 − b p)(1 − b π)[µt  +( 1− µ)th]
+b p b π[µt  +( 1− µ)[th + λ(th − t )] − c(θ,z)] + b p(1 − b π)t 
(1)
where the superscript M denotes that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
Rearranging and using the equilibrium values of b π and b p, (1) becomes
ELTC




3.1 The optimal property tax schedule {b t ,b th}
We have just seen that the equilibrium in the report-audit game depends
upon the value of the cost of audit c(θ,z) a n do nt h et a xs c h e d u l e{t ,t h}. In
this section we completely characterize the optimal tax schedule {b t ,b th}. In
order to have a benchmark, consider the full-information case, when the local
government observes vi. The local tax collection is characterized by t∗
  = v 
and t∗
h = vh. Let’s deﬁne the threshold c ≡ (1 − µ)(vh − v ).
Proposition 2 When c(θ,z) ≥ c, the optimal property tax schedule is such
that the local authority never audits and thus b t  = v . When c(θ,z) <c , the
optimal property tax schedule is




Facing this tax schedule, the h-habitant misreports with probability b p and the
local tax authority audits with probability b π.




h = vh. In order to prevent tax evasion, the local author-
ity distorts downwardly the property tax for a habitant with a high-valued







[(1 − µ)vh − c(θ,z)]
We can now intuitively explain why imposing t  <t h in Section 4 was not
a binding constraint. The reason is that, even without this constraint, the
local authority never chooses t  ≥ th as an optimal tax schedule. Assume the
contrary. Only the  -habitant misreports and the equilibria of the report-
audit game are qualitatively similar that the equilibria shown above. Either
the local authority does not audit and thus her expected tax collection is
th ≤ t  ≤ v . Or the local authority audits and faces misreports. In this last
case, because the cost of audit, the expected tax collection is strictly below
µt  +( 1− µ)th ≤ t  ≤ v . Hence the local authority never designs a tax
schedule th ≤ t  because she obtains less than v .
3.2 The trade-oﬀ between local tax administration’s
eﬃciency and lobbying for central transfers
N o ww eh a v et oc o n s i d e rb o t hr e g i o n sr = j,k. In region j, the local authority
chooses how to allocate her initial budget B to maximize the (expected) net
revenue
ENRj = Tj + ELTCj
On the one hand, the local authority may allocate an amount θj of her budget
to improve her tax administration’s eﬃciency. This enables the local author-
ity to reduce the cost of audit c(θj,z j). But, to undertake such a reform,
the local authority faces some political costs o(θj,d j),w h e r edj represents a
measure of how divided is the local government. we assume that this function















The higher is θj, the more opposition to improve the eﬃciency of her tax ad-
ministration the local authority faces. Moreover, whenever the local govern-
ment is more divided, the local authority faces more opposition to implement
a marginal increase in θj.
On the other hand, the local authority may allocate her budget lobbying
the federal government in order to obtain a discretionary transfer Tj.W e
7formalize such activity using an ‘special-interest politics’ framework and de-
noting it by lj. The federal government distributes, in a discretionary way,
an amount T between both regions. So its budget constraint is Tj +Tk = T.
The federal government maximizes
W = W(Tj,T k)+Rlj
On the one hand, the federal government values the transfers to the regions
a c c o r d i n gt oaw e l f a r ef u n c t i o nW(Tj,T k). For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that
W(Tj,T k)=V (Tj)+V (Tk)
where V ()is an increasing and concave function satisfying V (0) = 0 and the
Inada conditions. On the other hand, the federal government also derives
utility from the lobby exerted by region j. This lobby can reprsent, for
example, promises for future help in Congress. But this lobby is evaluated
according to the degree of political over-representation R ≥ 1 that the region
has in the Congress.
Therefore, everything is as if the region proposes to the federal govern-
ment a scheme lj(Tj), implying that the region commits to lj if the federal
government sets Tj. This scheme has to be accepted by the federal govern-
ment. In order to obtain the minimum level of welfare W0 that the fed-
eral government will accept, consider what should be the transfers when no
arrangement has been reached between the region and the federal govern-





Tj + Tk = T
The solution is straightforward: Tj = Tk = T
2. Hence the minimal level of
welfare is W0 =2 V (T
2).




Tj − lj − o(B − lj,d j)+
µj+λj
1+λj v  + 1
1+λj[(1 − µj)vh − c(B − lj,z j)]
s.t.
W ≥ W0
2Let’s denote by θ
∗
j the optimal value when the region cannot lobby the federal gov-
ernment and by l∗
j, the optimal value when the region does not invest in reforming her
tax administration. If both θ
∗
j >Band l∗
j >B ,due to the concavity oi the problem, it is
without loss of generality to restraint our attention to the case θj + lj = B.
8Clearly, at the optimum, W = W0. So we know that if the region wants a
transfer Tj, the amount of lobby should be
lj =
2V (T











If we assume an interior solution (i.e. b Tj > T
2), the ﬁrst-order condition





0(b Tj) − V




where the subscripts denote the partial derivative with respect to the ﬁrst




[V 00(b Tj)+V 00(T − b Tj)][1 − 1
1+λjc1 − o1]
− 1




With all these results, we can perform some comparative statics. The
following proposition characterizes the ﬁrst important result.
Proposition 3 When the federal budget for discretionary transfers decrease,
the regional lobby decreases
This proposition states that ﬁscal eﬀort depends negatively on the possi-
bility of obtaining dicretionnary transfers from the federal government. When
the federal budget for such transfers converges to zero, the region adopts a
more eﬃcient ﬁscal behavior. This result contradicts the conventional wis-
dom that a tax sharing regime generates low tax eﬀort. If the federal gov-
ernment can commit to the amount of tranfers, the local level of tax eﬀort
w i l lb eo p t i m a l .I ti st h el a c ko fs u c hc o m m i t m e n tt h a tm a k e st h el o c a la u -
t h o r i t yt oe x e r tal o w e rl e v e lo ft a xe ﬀort, specially in the form of having an
ineﬃcient tax administration.
The other results are gathered in the following proposition
Proposition 4
1. When the local representation increases, the regional lobby increases
92. When the degree of geographical characterisitcs increases, the eﬀect on
the regional lobby is ambiguous.
3. When the regional authority faces a more divided local government, the
regional lobby increases
The ﬁrst and the last part of the proposition state intuitive results. Re-
gions with comparative advantage in lobbying the federal government or with
a high degree of divided government will seldom engage in improving the local
tax administration. The second part of the proposition shows an ambiguous
result because the ﬁnal outcome depends crucially on the functional assump-
tions of the cost c(θj,z j).
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the impact of discretionary transfers made by a Fed-
eral Government on the incentives of the regional authority to levy its taxes.
Usually, the literature considers only the level of tax collection as a proxi
of local ‘tax eﬀort’. We developed a theoretical model where many other
dimensions of the tax policy are endogenously determined, namely the in-
vestment in resources to improve the eﬃciency of the tax administration,
the property tax schedule and the audit policy. The most important point
concerns the fact that, instead of investing in reforming its tax administra-
tion, the local authority can also lobby the central government to obtain
discretionary transfers. This decision depends upon the ability of the local
government to negotiate with the central government (which depends on the
political representation of the region in the Congress). Thus, in our model,
intergovernmental transfers are endogenous and simultaneously determined
with the reform of the local tax system.
We solve the model backwards. As the local government cannot commit
to the auditing probability when it designs its tax policy, the equilibrium of
the audit-report game is in mixed strategies, with auditing and tax evasion.
Then we ﬁnd the optimal tax schedule. In order to reduce the stake for tax
evasion, the local government distorts downwardly the high-valued property
tax. Finally, we solve for the decision of the local government regarding
how much resources to invest for improving the level of eﬃciency of the
tax administration. We ﬁnd that this decision is negatively associated with
the domestic political and positively with the political representation in the
Congress. These results open the door for econometric tests.
105A p p e n d i x
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁnd the equilibria of the game between the local authority and the habi-
tant. As the habitant has two possible types i =  ,h with respective proba-
bility µ and 1 − µ, the report-audit game is Bayesian. As we have assumed
that the habitant knows his type whereas the local authority only knows the
distribution of types, we adopt an interim approach. In the following tables
we show the payoﬀs of the report-audit game. In each cell, the payoﬀsa r e ,
from the left to the right, those of the local authority (L.A.), the h-habitant
(h)a n dt h e -habitant. The pure strategies for the local authority are audit
(A) and not audit (NA); for the habitant, report truthfully (T) and misreport
(M).
If the  -habitant reports truthfully, the payoﬀsa r e
L.A. \ h T M
A
µt  +( 1− µ)th
−c(θ,z) ,v h − th,v   − t 
µt 




−F ,v   − t 
NA µt  +( 1− µ)th,v h − th,v   − t  t , vh − t ,v   − t 
If the  -habitant misreports, the payoﬀsa r e
L.A. \ h T M
A
µ(t  + F)
+(1 − µ)th
−c(θ,z)
,v h − th,
v  − t 
−F
µ(t  + F)





v  − t 
−F
NA th,v h − th,v   − th µth +( 1− µ)t , vh − t ,v   − th
First, we observe that for any pair of strategies of the local authority
and the h-habitant, truthfull report is a dominant strategy for a  -habitant.
Hence, from now on, we will work with the ﬁrst matrix of payoﬀs. Moreover,
recall that F = λ|th − t |.
If (1−µ)(1+λ)(th−t ) ≤ c(θ,z), the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies:
the local authority never audits and the h-habitant always misreports. If
(1 − µ)(1 + λ)(th − t ) >c (θ,z), we look for a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Let’s denote by π the probability that the local authority audits
and by p the probability that the h-habitant misreports. The h-habitant






⇔ vh − th = π(vh − th − λ(th − t )) + (1 − π)(vh − t )
Hence, the h-habitant plays a mixed strategy (p,1−p) if b π = 1
1+λ. Next, the







(1 − p)[µt  +( 1− µ)th − c(θ,z)] + p[µt  +( 1− µ)(th + λ(th − t ) − c(θ,z)]
=( 1− p)[µt  +( 1− µ)th]+pt 
So the local authority plays a mixed strategy (π,1−π) provided b p =
c(θ)
(1−µ)(1+λ)(th−t )
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let’s deﬁne the functions F(t ) ≡
c(θ,z)
(1−µ)(1+λ) +t  and G(t ) ≡
vh+λt 
1+λ . Then, in
order to completely characterize the optimal property tax schedule {b t ,b th},
recall that
• We are considering the case t  <t h.
• If th ≤ F(t ), the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies. The lo-
cal authority never audits and the h-habitant always misreports; thus
ELTCP = t .
• If th >F(t ), the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The local authority
audits with probability b π = 1
1+λ and the h-habitant misreports with
probability b p =
c(θ,z)
(1−µ)(1+λ)(th−t ). In this case, the expected tax collection
is
ELTCM =( 1 − b p)b π[µt  +( 1− µ)th − c(θ,z)]
+(1 − b p)(1 − b π)[µt  +( 1− µ)th]
+b pb π[µt  +( 1− µ)[th + λ(th − t )] − c(θ,z)] + b p(1 − b π)t 
• The tax schedule has to respect the limited liability constraints
t  ≤ v 
th ≤ vh
vh − th − λ(th − t ) ≥ 0 ⇔ th ≤ G(t )
12where the last expression reﬂects that, even after being audited and
penalized, a h-habitant cannot be totally expropriated. As G(v )=
vh+λv 
1+λ <v h, the constraint th ≤ vh is redundant.
Let’s deﬁne c ≡ (1 − µ)(vh − v ). With all this elements, we can easily
characterize the optimal property tax schedule using graphics. Three cases
have to be analyzed.
• CASE 1: c(θ,z) ≥ (1 − µ)vh
In this case, th ≤ G(t ) implies th <F(t ). Hence the equilibrium is in
pure strategies. The local authority maximizes the expected local tax
collection ELTCP = t  by setting b t  = v .
• CASE 2: c(θ,z) ∈]c,(1 − µ)vh[
In this case, we can visualize the solution in the following ﬁgure, which
shows the (t ,t h) space.
l t
) ( l t G
h t
h v





λ) )(1 - (1
) (
+ µ







The values v  and vh, the straight line with positive slope that repre-
sents the function G(t ) and the 45o degree line characterize the set of
feasible property tax schedules. Now the local authority can choose the
13property tax schedule {t ,t h} so that the equilibrium of the report-audit
game is either in mixed or in pure strategies.
Consider the ﬁrst possibility. In this case, the bold lines with negative
slope represent the iso expected local tax collection curves. Their levels
increase in the direction shown by the arrow. An equilibrium in mixed
strategies emerges when, for a given value of t ,F(t ) <t h ≤ G(t ). The
local authority maximizes the expected local tax collection by setting
t  → tA









This pair of values is represented in the graphic by the point A. With
these values
ELTC




because c(θ,z) >c . H e n c e ,t h eo p t i m a lp r o p e r t yt a xs c h e d u l ei sn o t
{tA
  ,t A
h}. Instead, the local authority will choose a property tax sched-
ule so that the equilibrium in the report-audit game is again in pure
strategies and thus b t  = v .3
• CASE 3: c(θ,z) ∈ [0,c]
This third case is similar to the second one. In the second case, when
the cost c(θ,z) decreases, there exists a value of c(θ,z) such that the
solution tA
  is no longer below v  and thus not feasible (by limited lia-
bility). This value of c(θ,z) is precisely c.T h eﬁgure is as follows.
3In this case, the local authority is indiferent between any tax th ∈ [v ,G(v )].
14l t
) ( l t G
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h v
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Consider the local authority implementing a mixed strategy equilibrium
in the report-audit game. This is possible again when, for a given value
of t ,F (t ) <t h ≤ G(t ). But now t ,≤ v  is binding. Under this cir-
cumstance, the local authority maximizes the expected net revenue by
setting
t  → tB















[(1 − µ)vh − c(θ,z)] >v  
because c(θ,z) <c .4 Hence, the optimal property tax schedule is
{tB
  ,t B
h}. As tB
h = G(v ) <v h, the local authority optimally distorts
downwardly the property tax for a h-habitant
4When c(θ,z)=c the local authority is indiﬀerent between playing in pure or in mixed
strategies.
155.3 Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
In order to prove these propositions, we diﬀerentiate totally the ﬁrst-order





∆V 00(T − b Tj) − 1
R[V 0(b Tj) − V 0(T − b Tj)][V 0(T
2) − V 0(T − b Tj)][ 1
1+λjc11 + o11]
∆[V 00(b Tj)+V 00(T − b Tj) − 1
R[V 0(b Tj) − V 0(T − b Tj)]2[ 1
1+λjc11 + o11]
> 0
where ∆ =1− 1
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